2 edition of Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements found in the catalog.
Source title: Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca Foscari Lectures (World Scientific Lecture Notes in Economics and Policy - Volume 7)
|Statement||World Scientific Publishing Company|
|Publishers||World Scientific Publishing Company|
|LC Classifications||Jul 29, 2019|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||xvi, 88 p. :|
|Number of Pages||58|
nodata File Size: 7MB.
You can help correct errors and omissions. If cooperation can emerge in the midst of the horrors of war, then surely we can find the right incentives to combat climate change. Oestreich compares three audit mechanisms with respect to the generated emission levels and the underlying incentives for truthful reporting: a random audit mechanism RAM which is mostly assumed in the literature and two competitive audit mechanisms CAM imperfectly or perfectly discriminating audit mechanisms, respectively.
However, the CAM with perfect discrimination may induce higher emissions than RAM. For instance, it was shown that similar results can be obtained for negotiations on the initial allocation Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements permits.
Apart from a bargaining over a uniform emission tax, he considered uniform emission reduction quotas. This grim picture challenges the perspective and design of international agreements. Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. The second paper by Pintassilgo et al. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch.
It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. First, the agreed abatement target is lower than first-best solution, allowing more countries to join an environmental treaty.
It became a formal topic of study in the 1950s and has since made significant impact on economics, political science and.
Simply put, more CO 2 produces more wealth.
In order to improve our understanding of actual treaty-making, and to contribute to a positive analysis of actual negotiations, he modelled negotiations as a Walrasian auction process in which governments make selfish and strategic proposals.